POST 9/11 INITIATIVES AND THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

MARK A. CHITWOOD, MAJOR USAR
M.S., Jacksonville State University, Jacksonville, AL, 1999

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2009

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Post 9/11 Initiatives and the Army Reserve Component

The US Army Reserve Component (RC), consisting of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR), has evolved significantly in the wake of 9/11. More specifically, the Army RC has transformed from a strategic to an operational reserve in order to support sustained deployments. Three significant initiatives have directly impacted the Army RC as it reorganizes into an operational force: modular brigade design and employment, standardized Army force generation (ARFORGEN) and increased emphasis towards providing civil support to the homeland. These initiatives provide the foundation for this thesis as the author reviews the impact they have had on the Army RC. This thesis explores three distinct courses of action (COAs) for Army RC force structure based on the 2015 modular force structure design. The author concludes that conditions have been met to fully integrate the USAR into the ARNG and proposes a force structure design to facilitate the integration saving money and manpower while enhancing capabilities for both homeland security and defense.
Name of Candidate: Major Mark Chitwood

Thesis Title: Post 9/11 Initiatives and the Army Reserve Component

Approved by:

________________________________, Thesis Committee Chair
John C. Barbee, M.Ed.

________________________________, Member
Alexander M. Bielakowski, Ph.D.

________________________________, Member
LTC Luis O. Rodriguez, LL.M.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2009 by:

________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

POST 9/11 INITIATIVES AND THE ARMY RESERVE COMPONENT by MAJ Mark A. Chitwood, 92 pages.

The US Army Reserve Component (RC), consisting of both the Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserve (USAR), has evolved significantly in the wake of 9/11. More specifically, the Army RC has transformed from a strategic to an operational reserve in order to support sustained deployments. Three significant initiatives have directly impacted the Army RC as it reorganizes into an operational force: modular brigade design and employment, standardized Army force generation (ARFORGEN) and increased emphasis towards providing civil support to the homeland. These initiatives provide the foundation for this thesis as the author reviews the impact they have had on the Army RC. This thesis explores three distinct courses of action (COAs) for Army RC force structure based on the 2015 modular force structure design. The author concludes that conditions have been met to fully integrate the USAR into the ARNG and proposes a force structure design to facilitate the integration saving money and manpower while enhancing capabilities for both homeland security and defense.
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<td>September 11, 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAMDC</td>
<td>Army Air and Missile Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>AC</td>
<td>Active Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Army Campaign Plan</td>
</tr>
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<td>AFSB</td>
<td>Army Field Support Brigade</td>
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<td>AGNOSC</td>
<td>Army Global Network Operations and Security Center</td>
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<td>AMC</td>
<td>Army Materiel Command</td>
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<td>APS</td>
<td>Army Prepositioned Stocks</td>
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<td>ARFORGEN</td>
<td>Army Force Generation Model</td>
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<td>ARNG</td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
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<td>ASC</td>
<td>Acquisition Support Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATEC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>BfSB</td>
<td>Battlefield Surveillance Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAB</td>
<td>Combat Aviation Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Civil Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>Contracting Support Brigade/Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESC</td>
<td>Sustainment Command (Expeditionary)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMC</td>
<td>Financial Management Center</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Brigade Operational Element</td>
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<tr>
<td>HRSC</td>
<td>Human Resources Support Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>In Accordance With</td>
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<td>IMCOM</td>
<td>Installation Management Command</td>
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<td>MDSC</td>
<td>Medical Deployment Support Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MDW</td>
<td>U.S. Army Military District of Washington</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Combat Support Brigade (Maneuver Enhancement)</td>
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<td>MEDCOM</td>
<td>Medical Command</td>
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<td>MLMC</td>
<td>Medical Logistics Management Center</td>
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<td>NETCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command</td>
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<td>NGIC</td>
<td>National Ground Intelligence Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCA</td>
<td>Posse Comitatus Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSG</td>
<td>Regional Support Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB(SO)</td>
<td>Support Brigade (Special Operations (Airborne))</td>
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<td>SDC</td>
<td>50 states, District of Columbia and the Commonwealhths of Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands</td>
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<td>SDDC</td>
<td>Surface Deployment and Distribution Command</td>
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<td>SMDC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOAR</td>
<td>Special Operations Aviation Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASM-G</td>
<td>Quartermaster Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>T-AVN</td>
<td>Aviation Brigade (Theater)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSC</td>
<td>Sustainment Command (Theater)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAR</td>
<td>United States Army Reserve</td>
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<td>USARC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Reserve Command</td>
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<td>USASOC</td>
<td>U.S. Army Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USMA</td>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
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CHAPTER 1

WHAT’S WRONG WITH THE STATUS QUO?

The Evolution of the State and Federal Reserve Force

The Army’s reserve has evolved significantly since its inception as a militia in 1636. The modern image of the Army National Guard (ARNG) began in 1903 with the implementation of the Militia Act (also called the Dick Act) which thrust the federal government into state politics by establishing procedures for a more direct and active role in organizing, training and equipping the ARNG in line with the existing standards for the active component (AC) of the Army.\(^1\) It also enacted provisions for the President to federalize and deploy the militia outside the United States in response to the shortfalls identified during the Spanish-American War.

The Dick Act provided the first significant overhaul to the militia since the Militia Act of 1792, which authorized the federalization of the militia for specific situations but never provided a dedicated federal reserve. The Secretary of War following the Spanish-American War, Elihu Root, expressed his concern about the nation’s lack of a federal reserve when he said:

\[\text{It is really absurd that a nation which maintains but a small Regular Army and depends upon unprofessional citizen soldiery for its defense should run along as we have done for one hundred and ten years under a militia law which never worked satisfactorily in the beginning, and which was perfectly obsolete before any man now fit for military duty was born. The result is that we have practically no militia system, notwithstanding the fact that the Constitution makes it the duty of federal Congress to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia and for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.}^2\]

Initially the Dick Act included provisions to establish a 100,000 man federal reserve force but this provision was removed prior to passage after facing stiff opposition.
in Congress. Congress did, however, enact legislation in 1908 that created a federal Medical Reserve Corps of a few hundred physicians. Four years later, a provision of the Army Appropriations Act of 1912 created the Regular Army Reserve now known as the United States Army Reserve (USAR). With war fast approaching, Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act in 1916 which provided greater support and oversight of the militia, and brought it more fully into the Army as a whole. The Act also changed the name of each state militia to the Army National Guard (ARNG) and created a federal advisory agency now known as the National Guard Bureau.

The demands of World Wars I and II grew both the USAR and ARNG and by the end of World War II almost one in four US Army officers were Army Reservists with many serving in combat arms units as well as combat support. The end of the Vietnam conflict spurred arguably the most significant overhaul to the USAR since its inception when the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Creighton W. Abrams directed its reorganization. He realized that many Soldiers in the USAR served in combat support and combat service support roles in their civilian jobs and placed even more emphasis on realigning the USAR to more effectively exploit their specialties. He also concluded that the extended use of US forces without Congressional approval was possible because there were numerous combat support and combat service support units existing in the active force.

With this in mind, Abrams used the Army’s downsizing after Vietnam to transfer a significant number of support units to the USAR. In his opinion, a President would now have to mobilize the reserve alongside the active forces preventing them from fighting a protracted conflict without Congressional mandate as happened during the
Vietnam War\textsuperscript{6}. Despite the fact that some may disagree with General Abrams’ analysis, his recommendations had a significant impact on the force structure of the RC, and figures 1--3 show the reorganization of the total Army by 1990. This was the culmination of the Army’s reorganization just prior to their operational employment in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in 1991.

![Figure 1. 1990 Total Army Combat Force Allocation by Component](image1)


![Figure 2. 1990 Total Army Combat Support Force Allocation by Component](image2)

In 1990, the USAR evolved into a more autonomous organization through the establishment of a centralized command and control structure. The position of Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) had existed since passage of the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act in 1967 but the command and control of the USAR remained directly under AC control. The National Defense Authorization Act of 1990 established the US Army Reserve Command placing all USAR units under the command and control of the CAR as a subordinate command to US Army Forces Command.7

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 shocked the entire world and brought our nation out of relative calm into a persistent conflict against a non–state enemy. The 9/11 attacks exposed our homeland defense vulnerabilities to an extent not witnessed since the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941. These vulnerabilities were compounded through natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina which further taxed the Army’s ability to protect the homeland from both external attacks and natural disasters.

Throughout the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), the Army has stretched its Soldiers thin through multiple, long–term deployments to both Afghanistan and Iraq. To
increase the effectiveness of the total Army, all three components -- the AC, ARNG, and USAR have become intertwined throughout various command levels on multiple fronts. Additionally, the rapid and frequent mobilizations of the RC have changed it from a strategic force to an operational one. This definitional change of purpose better reflects the current employment of the RC as they routinely deploy right alongside their active counterparts.

Three significant initiatives have been implemented within the Army since 9/11 that directly affect the RC: modular force conversion, the Army force generation (ARFORGEN), and the increased need for the Army to provide civil support (CS) to the homeland. These initiatives serve as the basis for this thesis and provide the foundation for the author’s research.

The first major initiative is modularity. The modular brigade initiative began in 2004 with the primary goal of increasing the number of brigade (BDE) combat teams to meet operational needs while preserving combat effectiveness that is equal to or better than the previous division centric force. The centerpiece for modularity is the three maneuver BDEs: Heavy, Stryker, and Infantry. These combat BDEs ensure the Army has a fully capable force that can be easily task organized when necessary. The previously designed division centric force was not as flexible and Army leaders now have a greater ability to organize the force for specific missions. The Army also designed supporting modular BDEs to fully round out the modular concept and by the end of 2008, the Army transformed 84 percent of its units to the modular BDE force structure.

The next major post 9/11 Army initiative is the method for generating deployable forces. The Army developed Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) to provide a
progression of increased unit readiness over time resulting in recurring periods of availability of trained, ready, and cohesive units. More specifically, the ARFORGEN process was designed to provide units in both AC and RC components of the Army greater predictability with a planned 3:1 rotation cycle for the AC and 5:1 for the RC. Additionally, the ARFORGEN cycle seeks to streamline force generation inefficiencies by more rapidly preparing units for operational employment. The Title 10 employment differences between the ARNG and USAR become increasingly blurred as both rotate through the ARFORGEN process in the same manner.

The heightened need for the Army to provide civil support (CS) to the homeland serves as the third and final significant initiative influencing this thesis. CS employability of the ARNG and the USAR differ based on their legal status and level of command and control. This area is one that the author finds would most significantly benefit from restructuring the RC. The ARNG serves as an organic military force for each state, district and commonwealth (SDC) and is the primary force used for nonfederal emergencies such as natural and manmade disasters. On the other hand, the USAR is a federal reserve which, alongside the AC, requires a separate federal chain of command (one for the state force and the other for the federal force) for operational employment when the ARNG is not federalized. The Army initiatives of modularity, ARFORGEN, and CS are discussed in greater detail in chapters 3 and 4.

Research Question

Most discussions about integrating the USAR and ARNG seem significantly slanted based on the organization to which the writer belongs. Politics serve as a major culprit stifling serious debate about improving organizational structure and capabilities of
the RC as a whole. The author thinks conditions have changed dramatically enough since 9/11 based on the three initiatives of modularity, ARFORGEN, and CS to objectively relook at RC structure in its entirety. Specifically, the author answers the following question in this thesis. Based on the post 9/11 security environment, and in light of the US Army initiatives towards modular unit conversion, ARFORGEN and increased requirement to provide CS to the homeland, can the Army RC consisting of both the ARNG and USAR restructure to enhance overall capabilities with a more autonomous force?

Additionally, the author addresses a couple of secondary questions to more comprehensively articulate the efficiencies gained through RC restructuring. For example, what potential savings are possible through the integration in terms of money, manpower and TDA organizational oversight? What kind of redundant expenses could we eliminate through RC restructuring?

**Terminology Discussion**

It is important to understand some key terms and concepts to digest the information provided in this thesis. First the author summarizes the legal foundation for both the USAR and ARNG. As defined in the United States Code (USC), the US armed forces reserve consists of seven organizations: ARNG, USAR, Navy Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve and the Coast Guard Reserve. Also, there are three different types of federal mobilizations outlined in Title 10 USC that govern their employment: Presidential Reserve Call--up, Partial Mobilization and Full Mobilization. Title 32 USC governs the National Guard which consists of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard.
The ARNG serves in one of three capacities and they are: state force, Title 32 force or Title 10 force. Throughout this thesis, the 54 states, District of Columbia and Commonwealths of Guam, Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico will be referred to as SDC’s unless stated otherwise. Also, the term ARNG will refer to the ARNG serving its respective SDC, in either a state or Title 32 capacity, unless specified separately as a federalized Title 10 force. The National Guard remains under the control of the leadership in each state, the District of Columbia, Guam, Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico unless federalized under one of the three Title 10 USC types of federal mobilization listed above.

Serving as either the state force or Title 32 force, the ARNG works directly for the SDC leader for whom they belong but when they are designated a Title 32 force by the Department of Defense, all of their funding derives from the federal budget. Figure 4 helps to further delineate the differences between state service, Title 32 service and Title 10 service.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command and Control</th>
<th>State Active Duty</th>
<th>Title 32</th>
<th>Title 10</th>
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<tr>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>Governor</td>
<td>President</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Where</th>
<th>IAW State Laws</th>
<th>CONUS</th>
<th>Worldwide</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pay</td>
<td>State</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Federal</td>
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<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>IAW state law; includes riot control, law enforcement, emergency response</th>
<th>Training and other federally authorized missions, including disaster response under the Stafford Act</th>
<th>Worldwide training and operations as assigned by Joint CDR</th>
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<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>State Military Code</th>
<th>State Military Code</th>
<th>UCMJ</th>
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| Support Law Enforcement? | Yes | Yes | Limited by PCA |

Figure 4. Summary of National Guard Status  

Throughout this thesis the term RC will only include the Army RC, consisting of the ARNG and USAR, unless stated otherwise. The RC serves an integral role in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) support to both homeland defense and security. The homeland includes the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, US territories and possessions, and the surrounding territorial waters and airspace. These terms may, at times, have overlapping applicability but are distinctively different in many ways.

Homeland defense is defined as, “the protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.” Per Article II of the US Constitution, “the President is given the authority as the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces and of the militia of several states when called into the actual service of the United States.” DOD serves as the executive federal agency for homeland defense.
“External threats” typically exist outside the United States but are increasingly becoming more of a risk inside the US as witnessed by the attacks on 9/11. DOD efforts towards defeating external threats within the US create situations where aspects of homeland defense and homeland security overlap.

Homeland security is defined as,

a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.\(^\text{15}\)

Just as DOD serves as the federal executive agency for homeland defense, either the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) or Justice (DOJ) serve as the executive agency for homeland security issues, depending on the situation.\(^\text{16}\) Joining the DHS in 2003, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) serves as the lead DHS agency for CS response. Specifically, their mission is to reduce the loss of life and property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural disasters, acts of terrorism, and other manmade disasters, by leading and supporting the Nation in a risk--based, comprehensive emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.\(^\text{17}\)

The National Response Plan, which outlines DOD’s role for most foreseeable types of CS incidents, is used by the DHS to synchronize homeland security efforts by all federal agencies.\(^\text{18}\) DOD’s role in homeland security is further defined as civil support to the homeland which will simply be referred to as civil support (CS) throughout this thesis. CS capabilities are derived from, “DOD warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign and/ or domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions.”\(^\text{19}\) CS operations are further divided into three broad categories of domestic emergencies, designated law enforcement support, and other activities.
Anyone studying the employment of Army forces for CS would be remiss without a fundamental understanding of the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) contained in Title 18 USC 1385. The PCA has evolved over time and contains 26 statutory exceptions that have been added since it was first written in 1878.20 However, the original intent of the Act remains fundamentally the same which limits the powers of the federal government to use the military for direct law enforcement within the homeland. The PCA specifically prohibits the interdiction of a vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or similar activity; search and/or seizure; arrest, apprehension, “stop--and--frisk” detentions, and similar activities; and use of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.21

The PCA restrictions only apply to forces that are in a Title 10 status and do not apply to the ARNG when serving in a SDC or Title 32 capacity.

**Significance**

In reviewing the past several decades of intense use of the reserve components, most notably as an integral part of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the homeland, the Commission has found indisputable and overwhelming evidence of the need for policymakers and the military to break with outdated policies and processes and implement fundamental, thorough reforms in these areas. The members of this Commission share this view unanimously. We note that these recommendations will require the nation to reorder the priorities of the Department of Defense, thereby necessitating a major restructuring of laws and DOD’s budget. There are some costs associated with these recommendations, but the problems are serious, the need to address them is urgent, and the benefits of the reforms we identify more than exceed the expense of implementing them.

— Arnold Punaro,
*Final Report of Commission on the National Guard and Reserves*

The US Army faces significant “troop to task” challenges as it continues to deploy forces to multiple combat zones throughout the foreseeable future. Budgetary and
recruitment issues further hinder the Army’s ability to provide an adequate ground force prompting numerous studies focused on creating efficiencies within the Army without sacrificing capabilities. One part of the Army that arguably provides the most potential for improvement is the RC. According to a 2008 Government report, the cost of the RC is approximately 23 percent of the amount needed to man, train, equip, and sustain the active component proving it is a cost effective force. Because the RC is roughly half of the total Army structure, it is easy to see how restructuring the RC could provide significant budgetary and personnel savings for the Army.

The RC is transforming alongside the active force and great strides have been made towards achieving modularity and ARFORGEN goals. In 2007 alone, ARFORGEN improvements allowed United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) to identify 30,000 additional troops for deployments to Iraq. Additionally, the initiative to fully man every unit led the Director of the National Guard Bureau to close more than 150 armories allowed the ARNG to fill units to 91 percent strength providing cost savings in infrastructure support. This is just a sample of the efficiencies already achieved through modularity and ARFORGEN. As stated previously, the purpose of this thesis is to determine ways for restructuring the RC as a whole to provide a more responsive and decentralized SDC force without detracting from the Army’s requirement for a federal reserve.

The author provides the following theoretical situation to illustrate CS response inefficiencies that currently exist within the RC. In a small town in rural Missouri along the Mississippi River there are two combat support military police companies--one ARNG and the other USAR. By the military table of organization and equipment
(MTOE) they are the same type of company with the same manning, equipment and capabilities. This town becomes flooded and the Governor mobilizes the ARNG military police company while simultaneously seeking federal mobilization of the same USAR company across town.

The flood is so extensive most citizens in the city evacuate creating a need to supplement local police for civil law enforcement purposes. The ARNG military police company, under the command and control of the Governor, mobilizes fulfilling all requirements (flood mitigation, civil law enforcement, transportation assistance, etc) while the USAR awaits federal mobilization per the Stafford Act. Even when the USAR company is mobilized, two separate chains of command are required; one for the ARNG company working in a state or Title 32 capacity for the Governor and the other for the USAR company as a federal force. Additionally, the USAR company will not be able to provide direct civil law enforcement support due to PCA limitations. Soldiers from the USAR military company could witness certain criminal activity while sandbagging the flooded river bank and, under most circumstances, would be legally restricted from apprehending the offender(s). The ARNG company, as a state force, would have no such limitations. Although there may be exceptions in certain circumstances, this scenario demonstrates a palpably inefficient use of available resources and is at the crux of this research project. The author discusses how these inefficiencies affected the Hurricane Katrina response in chapter 2.

Simply put, restructuring the RC could create a larger Title 32 force for CS response. Joint Publication 3-28 (Civil Support) outlines the important role the ARNG plays in CS to the homeland. They will most likely be the first responder within DOD to
the CS incident based on their proximity and localized command and control. Through
the Governor, the ARNG actions are closely coordinated with state agencies, political
subdivisions and neighboring and supporting states. In many states the Adjutant General
also serves as the director of homeland security, director of emergency management or
both working closely with federal government agencies. Localized response provides the
preferred method to overcome CS incidents. This leaves the ARNG as the most
flexible force to provide initial CS to the homeland as they are decentralized and not
restricted against providing direct law enforcement support.

**Delimitations**

Arguably the most significant aspect related to altering the RC organizational
structure is political feasibility. Passionate political debates about the RC date back to
the inception of the ARNG in 1636 and the author will not delve into this contentious
arena. Additionally, since this thesis is an objective proposal not officially sanctioned by
the US Army, the author cannot simply seek input from SDC leaders as it would cast the
perception this research is officially sanctioned. This will not be a major hindrance as
this thesis focuses more on the objective feasibility through an employment analysis as
opposed to the subjective political viability. Hopefully this thesis provides the
appropriate amount of objective analysis to complement the subjective political
considerations.

The topic of restructuring the RC provides a platform for multiple thesis topics so
the author refined his scope to provide a more focused one. Unfortunately this means all
aspects of restructuring the RC cannot be analyzed in this thesis. The most difficult
aspect of restructuring the RC is in the realm of personnel management. The ARNG is
managed at the SDC level while the USAR is managed federally. Restructuring the RC creates significant personnel implications such as personnel transfers between federal and SDC organizations and standardizing federal and SDC management practices. This thesis provides an objective analysis about altering the RC organizational structure based on current initiatives. It will not address the subsequent personnel management issues since they could easily stand as a separate body of research.

The methodical process for this thesis includes defining the problem and framing research questions; reviewing literature in the field of study and supporting the research question; selecting a research approach; collecting evidence; analyzing and interpreting evidence; drawing conclusions; and making recommendations. Chapter 2 provides analysis of the literature written about the USAR and ARNG as it applies to the author’s topic. Chapter 3 discusses the research method and describes how it addresses the primary and secondary research questions. Chapters 4 and 5 comprise the research analysis and findings. Specifically, chapter 4 compares three courses of action (COAs) using the evaluation method outlined in chapter 3 while chapter 5 provides a summary of the findings and discusses areas the author recommends for further research along with concluding thoughts.


3Ibid., 1.

4Ibid., 37.

Ibid.


James Wombwell, Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), #.


Ibid, I-1.


23 Elizabeth Collins, "Army to Operationalize Reserve Component" (*Fort Leavenworth Lamp*, October 10, 2008).

24 Ibid.

CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE AND DATA

Debates about the organization and employment of the Army reserve component (RC) have existed since their inception with little significant organizational change. The urgency required to fix the shortfalls identified since the United States (US) began fighting the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requires us take another serious look at the RC. Since the author’s topic is one of restructuring in the post 9/11 environment, the foundation for the research is somewhat contemporary. The author limited the scope of RC related documents to those published after 9/11. This ensures relevant authors consider the Army initiatives of ARFORGEN, modularity and civil support (CS) when stating their case.

Hurricane Katrina: A Case Study about Civil Support to the Homeland

Hurricane Katrina made landfall in August 2005 as a Category 3 storm and became the costliest hurricane and one of the five deadliest storms in US history. The devastation stretched from Florida to Texas, with the most significant loss of life and property damage occurring in New Orleans, Louisiana where the city’s levee system failed. Further hampering relief efforts, this disaster occurred when the nation was fighting the GWOT on multiple fronts; most significantly in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), subordinate to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS), served as the lead federal agency responsible for coordinating response efforts throughout the disaster area. The Department of Defense (DOD) regional Combatant Command, US Northern Command
(NORTHCOM), served as the lead DOD headquarters supporting DHS efforts.

Immediately prior to Hurricane Katrina making landfall, NORTHCOM established Joint
Task Force (JTF) Katrina at Camp Shelby, Mississippi. The JTF grew to 22,000 Soldiers
providing relief efforts alongside approximately 50,000 Title 32 National Guard
personnel from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and three Commonwealths
(SDC).¹

The National Guard is unique in that its forces operate under one of three different
statuses. The three statuses refer to the “National Guard of the several states,” serving
the state directly or in a Title 32 status, and the “National Guard of the United States”
serving in a Title 10 capacity. In both cases of the National Guard of several states, there
are no Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) limitations for their employment. The primary
difference between serving the state directly and Title 32 status is the funding source.
The respective states foot the bill for direct state service while the federal government
pays for Title 32 service. Figure 4 in chapter 1 illustrated this point.

Unlike the federal active component (AC) and RC forces, the, “National Guard of
several states” was among the first responders in Mississippi and Louisiana initially
under orders of the SDC from which they originated. The National Guard personnel
remained under the command of the SDC for which they originated but operational
control shifted to the Governor of the state where they served. Soon after they were
deployed, the Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense approved redesignation of the
National Guard forces from state service to Title 32 service with the federal government
assuming fiscal responsibility for the National Guard forces. The Title 32 designation
only affected the origination of funding for the National Guard (federal vice SDC) while the command structure for them remained the same.

In contrast to the Hurricane Andrew response in 1992 where the National Guard comprised only 24 percent of the force, they constituted 70 percent of the overall military response force during Hurricane Katrina. Specifically, the ARNG made a direct impact in civil law enforcement at some of the more lawless phases of the hurricane response. During this time the New Orleans Police Department had only 1,600 police officers the ARNG backfilled with 4,200 military police Soldiers which dramatically improved the overall security environment.² Because they served in a Title 32 capacity, they were able to enforce local and state laws, and those activities would have been restricted by the PCA had they been a federal force. At its height, 72,000 Active, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers, Sailors and Airmen provided relief support making Hurricane Katrina response operations the largest in our nation’s history.³

Hurricane Katrina produced numerous challenges and certainly lessons learned can be applied to future situations. The Commanding General of NORTHCOM, Admiral Keating, testified that although the National Guard employed 50,000 Soldiers and Airmen, coordination between them and the 22,500 federal forces from both the AC and USAR was not as good as it should have been. Admiral Keating went on to say that he recognizes the pivotal role the ARNG will have in future CS situations. However, the nation should have the capability to leverage AC forces that have the inherent structure and capacity to achieve unity of effort when assembling and directing a large scale, multi-state response to a catastrophic event.⁴
The author thinks Hurricane Katrina response illustrates the effectiveness of AC/RC cooperation in providing CS. Most of the information the author found about Hurricane Katrina response separated military forces into two categories; federal and then the ARNG, with the USAR falling into the federal forces category. This makes it difficult to discern the true contributions of the USAR from their AC and USAR counterparts. However, the contributions of the National Guard, and more specifically the ARNG, are well documented. The author also finds the immediate responsiveness and localized control of the National Guard to be an essential component to DOD’s success in CS. For this reason, the author concludes that additional ARNG forces within the RC component can only help improve CS response capabilities in the future.

A Seminal Look at the Reserve Component

An independent Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) was sanctioned under the 2005 Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act. The CNGR presented its last of three reports to Congress on January 31, 2008 outlining six major conclusions and 95 recommendations supported by 163 findings. Their reports provide the first formal assessment of the National Guard and Reserve since World War II. The findings have spurred extensive debate and quantify how badly the RC needs to change to provide a more viable post 9/11 force. The Commission concluded, the consequences of not fundamentally reforming today's "operational reserve" are unacceptable. Operational readiness is damaged by outdated policies in the areas of personnel, compensation and benefits, and retirement. The nation cannot afford to lose ready access to its highly skilled reserve forces, which also serve as vital links between America's communities and the military.5

There are some interesting findings that directly relate to the author’s thesis and the RC as a whole. For example, the CNGR recommended Congress establish an office
for the Director of the Army National Guard (DAG) and an office for the Director of the Air National Guard within the Army and Air Force staffs, respectively. These positions would provide a direct Title 10 advisory link to each of the SDC National Guard components within the Army and Air Force. The directors of these offices would have responsibilities similar to those held by the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve. However, unlike the CAR who has direct command and control of all USAR forces, the DAG would not have similar oversight of ARNG forces as they remain under SDC control unless designated as a federal force.

The CNGR further asserted that the ARNG and USAR are not properly configured to conduct CS and that Governors should have broader control of military forces in their state to respond to natural or manmade disasters. The recommendation to provide broader control of military forces to Governors is arguably the most controversial as it would set a new precedent placing federal forces under state control. According to the CNGR, pairing active duty Soldiers with ARNG Soldiers would provide all forces in a respective state with unity of purpose and clarity of command. The author illustrated the current problems with this disjointed command and control structure through the hypothetical scenario provided in chapter 1.

The author agrees that Governors need greater access to more military forces for CS but proposes a more robust ARNG force to enhance this capability. Besides the practical concerns related to placing federal forces under Governor control, this structure may not be in the nation’s best interests or even constitutional. Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs reinforces the author’s opinion by stating,
the proposal of the Punaro commission is at odds with the theory of a federal system of government. It is at odds with Article II of the Constitution. There can be only one Commander in Chief, and that is the President of the United States. To decentralize that command and control to 50 separate state governors invites confusion.⁷

Major General (retired) Arnold Punaro served as the Chairman of the CNGR. In an interview conducted after the CNGR’s report was published, he argued there are four or five significant changes the U.S. must make simultaneously to fix the armed forces reserve. He asserted that the security of the country is more vulnerable in the homeland than it is overseas. He said the DHS is woefully unable to provide the security essential to our nation and DOD is the only agency capable of adequately performing this task. He further stated that he thinks Congress should proclaim protecting the homeland is equal in priority to overseas combat missions. When it comes to emergency response within the United States, Punaro points out that American citizens do not care who comes to their rescue—they can be AC, USAR, or ARNG as long as someone provides the support they need. In summary, he states

if our military is going to be able to respond to the threats overseas and to the homeland—particularly the new ones in the homeland—you need to have an integrated total force that allows the Department of Defense to use all the trained personnel we have available, not just like stovepiped pockets. [That means] you need a much more flexible integrated pay and personnel system, personnel management system, promotion system, and retirement system.⁸

Punaro further predicts the active force will get smaller in the future. The economics of an all-volunteer force do not allow such a sizable formation as the associated recruiting, retaining and sustaining costs are financially prohibitive. With this prediction for the active force, Punaro highlights the need for a more capable reserve force to offset the active shortfalls. Specifically, he reiterates the need for an operational
reserve. This protects the US from the undesirable need to reinstitute the draft and Punaro thinks the mere possibility of that occurring should motivate us to institute the changes outlined in his Commission’s report.⁹

In a separate article, Punaro discussed the importance of keeping a viable reserve force by outlining three primary reasons we must maintain an operational reserve. The first being support to the defense of this nation pointing out that contributions of the ANRG and USAR have increased almost 500 percent compared to pre 9/11 levels. He even said that without the RC, fighting with the current level of troops in both Afghanistan and Iraq would not be possible without reinstating the draft.

The second reason is the need to address new threats in the homeland. Providing a response to natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina is arguably as important, if not more important, than anything we are doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. The RC is obviously important to the overall security of the homeland because DHS does not have the resources to fulfill this role without the use of military forces as the frontline for emergency response. Reflecting this sentiment, the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act mandates more DOD involvement in CS but does not clarify the role they will play as it relates to the DHS and other federal agencies.

The third reason for preserving an operational reserve is simple economics. The RC provides the most cost-effective force for our nation proving to be about 70 percent less expensive than the AC. This will most likely be a significant consideration as the new Presidential administration seeks ways to reduce the overall DOD budget.¹⁰

In November 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates tasked DOD to develop and implement plans taking action on 64 of the 95 recommendations made by the CNGR.
These 64 implementations are in addition to the 18 the DOD had already begun resulting in a total of 82, or 86 percent of the recommendations being acted upon. One of the recommendations the Secretary of Defense chose not to institute was establishment of the Director of ARNG and the Director of the Air National Guard within their respective components. These positions would be similar to the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR) who works directly for the Chief of Staff of the Army as mentioned in chapter 1. In its absence, the National Guard Bureau exists and serves as a joint headquarters providing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and separate components with guidance about employing all National Guard forces.

The author thinks enacting this recommendation would be essential if the RC is restructured to give the ARNG more federal oversight. The Director of the ARNG (DAG) could essentially replace the office of the CAR and assume command and control over all federal reserve forces remaining in the RC while providing advisory guidance to the SDC leaders for the SDC ARNG forces.

A vast majority of the CNGR recommendations were formalized throughout multiple strategy documents published by the DOD since 2005. The 2008 *National Defense Strategy* (*NDS*) provides a framework for DOD strategic guidance and reflects the results of the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* (*QDR*). It outlines five key objectives to support the National Military Strategy: defend the homeland, win the long War, promote security, deter conflict and win our Nation’s Wars. The RC restructuring recommendations provided by the author must support these five objectives.

The 2006 *Army Game Plan* originates from the *National Military Strategy* (*NMS*). At the time of publication, neither the *National Military Strategy* nor the *Army Game
Plan had been updated since the publication of the 2008 NDS. However, Enclosure 16 (Operational Force Vice Strategic Reserve) of the 2006 Army Game Plan provided command guidance about the RC transformation. It states, “. . . we shifted our RC from a strategic reserve to an operational force. Our Army Reserve and our Guard are now an integral part of our operational force.” Here we see the shift in the employment of the reserve from a strategic resource rarely used to that of an operational resource that is systematically deployed under the directed ARFORGEN model. It is through this model that the federal requirements for both the ARNG and USAR blur significantly leading the author to question the validity of maintaining two separate reserve forces within the Army. The impact of the ARFORGEN initiative on the RC will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter 3.

Contemporary Research about the Reserve Component

In 2008, Jacob Alex Klerman, an author working for the Rand Corporation National Defense Research Institute, wrote a monograph for the Secretary of Defense entitled, Rethinking the Reserves. This monograph provides extensive analysis about the RC in light of the CNGR findings. Klerman analyzed various ways the USAR could reorganize to more capably serve in the GWOT. He recommended dividing the RC into two basic categories: conventional and unconventional. The conventional reserve is the force that currently exists, originally developed as a major augmentation to the AC for a relatively short period of time. According to his monograph, this force was not designed in a rotational context as it is being used now and was created to partake in the least amount of training necessary to maintain its relevance while providing a cost effective,
secondary force. As with most analysis since 9/11, the monograph concluded that the conventional reserve is no longer feasible.

The second category, unconventional reserve, is further subdivided into three more categories: intensive reserve, extended reserve, and cadre/new reserve. For the intensive reserve, Klerman concluded that an RC unit can be capable of more rapid deployments if they train longer throughout the year. For example, the average Reservist trains 39 days a year with a two to three month train-up prior to deployment. The monograph points out that it would be feasible to deploy this unit sooner, possibly upon notification, if they trained 60 to 90 days a year. The intensive reserve would obviously not comprise the entire reserve as it would have a much more dramatic impact on civilian employment.

The extended RC concept within the unconventional reserve derives from the Secretary of Defense’s decision to limit reserve mobilizations to 12 total months, which differs from the previous mobilization timeline of 12 months “boots on ground” (BOG). The 12 month BOG policy stretched the entire mobilization, or time away from home for the average Reservist, to 12-18 months. The monograph considered that some Reservists would be willing to deploy for a longer period of time at a greater frequency than the regular reserve force and the Army should create this separate reserve to maintain its uniquely capable force pool.

Finally, the cadre/new forces concept consists of reserve units comprised of a skeleton staff of senior cadre to be filled with fresh recruits when needed. Klerman’s analysis concluded that the number of reserve brigades (BDEs)Ts required for stability operations could be cut in half, thereby providing a significant cost savings for the Army.
The monograph outlines how this model would be executed within a deployment timeline similar to the ARFORGEN model.\textsuperscript{14}

The author agrees that changes need to be made to the conventional reserve (the basis of this thesis) but does not agree that the unconventional force is the appropriate method to do so; at least not as an initial step. In the author’s opinion, the RC first needs to reorganize to enhance overall capabilities, not further subdivided into additional categories that may only be relevant at this point in history. Klerman’s discussion about reserve force improvements does not fully consider CS, which the author finds crucial in the post 9/11 security environment. Additionally, the establishment of an unconventional reserve with additional training requirements would be difficult to balance with civilian employment demands.

The author found numerous pertinent research publications written at the US Army War College (USAWC) and Command and General Staff College (CGSC). One USAWC strategy research project, written by Michael Donovan entitled \textit{AC/RC Integration Programs: Keeping them Relevant}, discusses plans to integrate the USAR and the AC by removing Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) positions and filling them with AC officers. Donovan encourages the AC to expand AC/RC command exchange programs to further enhance exposure by both components to each other.\textsuperscript{15}

The author partially disagrees with these recommendations and thinks that even if they were implemented they would only provide a marginal solution to a complex organizational problem. The author thinks the Army should evaluate ways to restructure the RC as a whole prior to determining methods to enhance linkage between the AC and RC. Ironically, at this point in military history, there has arguably never been a more
integrated relationship between the AC and RC. Therefore, the problem highlighted in this research project may not be as significant as is purported.

Another USAWC publication, written by Lawrence L. Randle entitled Integrating Verses Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Reserve Forces, discusses the relevance of merging the ARNG into the USAR. This research project concluded that the ARNG should focus primarily on homeland defense, possibly serving directly for the DHS, while the USAR remain as a separate organization to provide specialty backfill for the AC. Randle concluded that the ARNG should eliminate its maneuver-oriented, divisional structure and reorganize as units more appropriate for serving in the CS role.\textsuperscript{16}

The author agrees that increased coordination is needed to improve homeland security efforts, but thinks this plan would have a significantly negative impact on the RC force structure as a whole. It would continue to maintain two organizations possessing redundant capabilities without either being structured for both CS and federal homeland defense missions. Randle also concludes that the PCA should be amended or eliminated to allow Title 10 forces to conduct civil law enforcement missions. The author disagrees with this recommendation and thinks this change would create an unwanted precedent. The US populace would most likely not accept placing federal military forces in a direct law enforcement role which the author thinks should remain relegated to the SDC forces. Even if PCA restrictions for federal forces were lifted, the complex issue of how federal military forces would enforce local and state laws would have to be resolved. Currently, federal forces can only enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
In order for federal forces to enforce local and state laws, some form of delegation from local and state authorities would be required. This would further complicate the command and control structure. PCA restrictions aside, the author still finds validity in restructuring the RC to streamline command and control for CS response.

A CGSC monograph, written by Elizabeth E. Dreiling entitled *The National Guard (NG): A Future Homeland Security Paradigm?*, discusses how the ARNG should execute a recommendation by the US Commission on National Security to fulfill a primary role in CS. The Commission recommended that the ARNG posture to assist first responders and provide state Governors with immediate command and control capability tied to a National Crisis Action Center. A review of domestic military CS requirements revealed that each of the ongoing missions necessary for CS already exist in Joint, Army, and National Guard doctrine. The monograph went on to highlight the unique employability provided by the ARNG to fully integrate interagency capabilities.

According to Dreiling, this serves as a viable template for ARNG CS coordination while maintaining warfighting capability to fight our nation’s wars.17 The author concurs with this assessment which is the premise of the thesis question focused at increasing CS support through RC restructuring.

Another USAWC article written by David Fautua entitled *How the Guard and Reserve will fight in 2025*, evaluated the steps the ARNG must take to remain relevant in the future. “Core competencies-not force structure-will be the currency each component must possess if it is to own a place in the Army After Next of 2025.”18 It pointed out, “reorganizations and integrations will involve trade-offs and the abandonment of traditional roles or missions for each component, but they will be in the best interests of
the Army in the long term.” The author agrees that both components of the RC must transform in order to remain relevant both in the current operational environment and in the Army after next.

Relevant Insights About the Reserve Component

In addition to the previously discussed research publications, there have been numerous interviews providing relevant insights about transforming the RC. The current state of the RC and its future employment was the subject of a seminar at the USAWC in 2008 where the panel members at the conference discussed the CNGR findings, which were published earlier in the year, as well as other current issues affecting the RC. First, the panel agreed there will be significant participation by the RC in current and future military operations as the active component is incapable of executing these missions alone. Because it provides more than 75 percent of the overall force structure for medical and transportation units, the RC is inseparably linked to the AC. However, the ARNG’s CS role has been severely degraded through multiple deployments in support of the GWOT, leaving the nondeployed ARNG units at barely 50 percent because most of their equipment is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The author finds no significant original insights derived from this conference but it did provide a senior military level endorsement for a vast majority of the findings published by the CNGR. The conference reinforced the contention that DHS is unable to fully secure the homeland and DOD intervention is required. The author’s thesis addresses this concern by analyzing ways to increase CS support through the COA analysis discussed in chapters 3 and 4.
The US Chief of Staff for the Army (CSA), General George Casey, has been extremely vocal about his desire to rebalance the Army since accepting his position in January, 2007. He acknowledges the previous existence of the “hollow Army,” especially prevalent in the RC, where units existed but were only marginally manned. The hollow Army led to a significant amount of cross--leveling during unit deployments throughout the first several years of mobilizations in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) which caused a great deal of upheaval. Soldiers in RC units met for the first time a month or so prior to their combat deployment at a mobilization station and underwent a standardized training cycle prior to being “certified” and deployed.

The most extreme example of cross--leveling the author witnessed was a transportation company that was mobilized with two organic Soldiers--the rest were cross--leveled from various units across the nation. General Casey wants to build a force that can be fully manned, and this thesis will address ways to restructure the RC to enhance capabilities across the spectrum of employment since the ambiguous question, “for what?,” seems to be continually evolving.

In an effort to determine ways to create efficiencies, General Casey asked his staff to review the best possible way to build the 1.1 million Soldier Army. He understands that identifying ways to create efficiencies without compromising capabilities will most likely be a top priority for the incoming Presidential administration. The author concurs with General Casey’s findings and thinks this thesis addresses an important aspect of the overall efficiency question as it relates to the RC.
Brigadier General (BG) Waff provided the author with some keen insights from the USAR’s point of view as it relates to the author’s thesis. BG Waff is a career USAR officer who currently serves as the Deputy Commander of the US Army Human Resources Command (HRC) and is intimately familiar with personnel policies within the USAR. BG Waff highlighted the direct linkage of the USAR to the AC unlike the relationship that exists with the ARNG. To further illustrate this linkage, he points out that the Chief of Army Reserve (CAR) commands USAR Soldiers while the Chief of the National Guard Bureau simply coordinates ARNG policies with no direct command authority. He also stated that 94 percent of the money spent on the ARNG was federal funding. Finally, BG Waff said the ARNG has been pushing dangerously close to a homeland defense pure role which may put them under the DHS like the US Coast Guard, further complicating their role within the DOD. Based on the author’s understanding of homeland defense and homeland security, it seems his concern is more aligned with the increased role of the ARNG in civil support to homeland security instead of homeland defense.

The author was unable to find any quantitative research regarding how the RC organizational structure compared against its post 9/11 requirements. The author thinks the pertinent findings of the CNGR as well as the other applicable research publications are muted by the lack of supporting data derived from RC restructuring comparisons. To fill this void, the author presents RC organizational analysis to add a more comprehensive element to the overall debate.

In the next chapter, the author describes the methodology and criteria for comparing and selecting a means for integrating the RC. The author discusses the
organizational design of the total Army and outlines the three distinct courses of action (COAs) for organizing the RC. Chapter 3 will also detail how the author plans to assess each COA to determine which one is the most promising method to restructure the RC so it can more effectively accomplish its mission.

1James Wombwell, Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), iii.


3James Wombwell, Army Support During the Hurricane Katrina Disaster (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009), 18-19.


8Ibid.


10Ibid., 17.


16 Lawrence Randle, “Integrating Verses Merging of the Guard and Reserve: Should the United States Continue to Maintain Duplicate Federal and State Military Reserve Forces” (Research Project, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 2002).


CHAPTER 3
A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH TO ANALYZING POST 9/11 ARMY INITIATIVES

The previous two chapters outlined the tremendous changes the Army Reserve Component (RC) has undergone since 9/11. With these changes, the author analyzed the significant body of research that addresses the state of the RC in the post 9/11 environment. Each source identified ways to improve the United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) as separate entities without any comprehensive research about ways to reorganize the USAR and ARNG to improve the RC as a whole.

The author focused his research to determine the best method for restructuring the RC to more effectively accomplish all of the requirements expected from both the ARNG and USAR. He framed the analysis by using a control group, variables and evaluation criteria to provide quantitative data for analysis. The control group for all three Course of Action (COAs) is the 2015 modular force plan, compared against the variables represented by three different organizational COAs. These three COAs are evaluated against the evaluation criteria of modularity and civil support (CS) as Army force generation (ARFORGEN) remains the same throughout. Each of these elements of research is discussed in greater detail within this chapter and chapter 4.

As mentioned in chapter 1, the author will not address the political implications of integration. Political considerations about integration are nearly impossible to quantify and have the potential to change rapidly depending on the current political environment and operational employment of the RC. Therefore, chapters 4 and 5 focus towards
analyzing each COA using Army initiatives that initially overhauled the RC as a forcing function but may now provide a more viable RC for the long term.

Before we can analyze the best way to organize the RC we must first understand what specifically is expected of both the USAR and ARNG. The USAR mission statement is

to provide trained and ready Soldiers and units with the critical combat service support and combat support capabilities necessary to support national strategy during peacetime, contingencies and war. The Army Reserve is a key element in The Army multi-component unit force, training with Active and National Guard units to ensure all three components work as a fully integrated team.¹

The USAR mission further expands to include enabling the Army, training Soldiers maintaining a force, building a stronger Army, anticipating the ever-evolving needs, implementing national objectives, keeping the Army mobile, supporting national policies, preserving the peace and security, overcoming aggressive acts and giving back to the community.²

An important aspect of the USAR’s support to the active component (AC) is the centralized command and control structure linked directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army through the Chief of the Army Reserve (CAR). By its original design, the USAR plays a significant role in supplementing shortfalls within the AC providing a steady state federal reserve. In execution, however, we see the ARNG and USAR units plugged into the ARFORGEN process to support federal missions in the same fashion. This occurs partly because the ARNG is about twice as large as the USAR but also because the ARNG contains more types of units, to include all of the modular combat brigades (BDEs), than the USAR.
The mission statement for the ARNG is understandably different and twofold.

Their federal mission statement reads

During peacetime each state National Guard answers to the leadership in the 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia. During national emergencies, however, the President reserves the right to mobilize the National Guard, putting them in federal duty status. While federalized, the units answer to the Combatant Commander of the theater in which they are operating and, to the President.3

While their state and territory mission statement reads,

The Army National Guard exists in all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia. The state, territory or district leadership are the Commanders in Chief for each Guard. Their Adjutants General are answerable to them for training and readiness of the units. At the state level, the governors reserve the ability, under the Constitution of the United States, to call up members of the National Guard in time of domestic emergencies or need.4

Based on the missions for both the USAR and ARNG, three key tasks emerge for the RC.

| Provide trained and ready Soldiers necessary to support national strategy during peacetime, contingencies and wars in a Title 10 capacity |
| Provide direct support to all 50 states, three territories and the District of Columbia for domestic emergencies |
| Fully integrate all three components (AC, USAR and ARNG) |

Figure 5. Key Functions for the Army Reserve Component

It is important that each evaluated COA accomplishes these three tasks to fulfill the role of the RC. Each COA is discussed in general terms below.

**COA 1 (Status quo)**

COA 1 reflects no change to the current ARNG and USAR organization within the RC and will essentially serve as the baseline to evaluate the other two COAs. As discussed in chapter 1, this organizational structure has essentially been in place for just over 100 years since the USAR’s establishment in 1908. This COA reflects two distinctly separate organizations within the RC--one (ARNG) focused on both its state, District and commonwealth (SDC) role as well as its federal role while the USAR addresses its federal responsibility to augment the AC.

**COA 2 (Return the USAR to its Original Purpose)**

COA 2 focuses on integrating most USAR forces into the ARNG with the USAR retaining specialty capabilities such as medical and special operations units. This COA reflects the original design purpose for the USAR as discussed in chapter 1. It creates a significant change from the status quo, specifically illustrating how greater CS employment capabilities can be derived from a larger ARNG force. It also eliminates capability redundancies among the ARNG and USAR.

**COA 3 (Full Integration of the USAR into the ARNG)**

COA 3 is the most dramatic as it includes dissolving the USAR as a separate organization. Under COA 3, most units integrate into the respective SDC headquarters. The remaining units would use the Title 10 organization of the Director of the ARNG
(DAG) to provide federal level command and control of the specialty capabilities such as medical and special operations units.

Modularity, ARFORGEN and homeland security initiatives provide the foundation for spurring change within the RC. The manner in which these initiatives impact the author’s COAs are discussed below.

**Modularity**

Modular conversion serves as a subcategory to one of the four Army initiatives outlined by the CSA; transform the Army. The 2015 modular force reflects the planned endstate for modular force conversion and depicts how the Army will be organized when all units have converted to the modular template. The author uses the 2015 modular force design to create COA 1, with no deviation, and to provide a common baseline for the other two COAs. This design serves as the most currently approved structure for the total Army at the time of publication. The 2015 modular force is depicted in figure 6 and discussed in more detail throughout chapter 4. The meaning of all acronyms contained within figure 6 can be found in the acronyms section at the beginning of this thesis. The author will also spell them out in chapter 4.
ARFORGEN

ARFORGEN serves as another subcategory to one of the four Army initiatives outlined by the CSA--transform the Army.  ARFORGEN defined is

A structured Army process that increases unit readiness over time, resulting in trained, ready and cohesive forces prepared for operational deployment. ARFORGEN sequences available units to continuously support civil authority and combatant commander force requirements.  

The ARFORGEN model was developed to transform the total Army from a tiered readiness force to a cyclical readiness force.  Figure 7 outlines how the ARFORGEN process achieved this transformation.  It also explains the differences between the former
Tiered deployment readiness plan for the RC and the current cyclical one commonly referred to as ARFORGEN. In a snapshot, figure 7 shows how the RC transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational one. No longer is the RC viewed as a “last resort” for federal missions but rather serves as an integral part of the total Army.

**Tiered Deployment Readiness and Cyclic Deployment Readiness (ARFORGEN) Comparisons**

- **Tiered Readiness**
  - Focus on the War Plan
  - Assumes time to respond to future conflict in mature theaters
  - Only ALO 1 units are ready to fight ("Have's and Have Not's")
  - Manning & Equipping Shortages: Operational Risk to Late Deployers
  - Cascading Modernization: RC units have M113s and M1 tanks

- **Cyclic Readiness**
  - Focus on Continuous Operations including the Warfight
  - Posture for sustained level of global commitment
  - Available and Ready Force Pool units are ready to fight
  - Synchronized Sourcing, Training & Resourcing Process
  - Equipment Maneuver Strategy: All AC and RC Units deploy with modernized equipment

**The New Paradigm in Army Force Generation:**

Directed mission determines resource priorities and readiness metrics.

*Figure 7. Tiered Deployment Readiness and Cyclic Deployment Readiness (ARFORGEN) Comparisons*

*Source:* Ted Cranford, Electronic correspondence with author, February 27, 2009.

Figure 8 graphically depicts the ARFORGEN cycle and highlights the key events that occur in the three phases of reset, train/ ready, and available.
ARFORCEGEN is a continuous and structured process of generating AC/RC forces to provide increased unit readiness over time. It provides available trained, ready, and cohesive units that are rapidly deployable and employable for Combatant Commanders and civil authorities.

Figure 8. ARFORCEGEN Model

Source: Ted Cranford, Electronic correspondence with author, February 27, 2009.

Figure 9 further defines each of the three force pools within ARFORCEGEN.

As depicted in the ARFORCEGEN model, RC forces are programmed into the readiness cycle in a manner never before seen in the RC. Forces programmed for training and deployment include all units within the RC and do not distinguish between the ARNG and USAR. Some may argue the long--term viability of the ARFORCEGEN process, but for the purpose of this thesis, the most important outcome deriving from ARFORCEGEN is that the differences between the ARNG and the USAR as a federal force no longer exist. In other words, the ARNG is programmed for federal service within the ARFORCEGEN model in the same manner as the USAR.
ARFORGEN FORCE POOLS

• **RESET Force Pool** - The RESET Force pool begins with establishment of unit’s Return Date. Units in RESET Force Pool perform following activities: Soldier-Family reintegration, block leave, and receive new personnel and equipment. AC units remain in RESET Force Pool for 180 days; RC units for 365 Days.

• **Train-Ready Force Pool** - Units perform individual and collective training tasks, continue to receive new personnel and equipment. Units achieve required Designated Mission Essential Task List (DMETL) capability level prior to deploying from Train-Ready or moving into Available Pool. Units are eligible for sourcing, if necessary, to meet operational (surge) requirements.

• **Available Force Pool** - The Army’s primary contribution to DoD’s Global Force Pool. Units will maintain mission execution readiness status and are made available for operational deployments. AC Units return to the RESET Force Pool upon redeployment or, if not deployed, completion of 12 months. RC Units return to the RESET Force Pool upon redeployment and/or demobilization.

Figure 9. ARFORGEN Force Pool Definitions

*Source:* Ted Cranford,. Electronic correspondence with author, February 27, 2009.

ARFORGEN is a significant catalyst for this thesis topic of RC integration but will not vary between the three COAs evaluated in chapter 4. The is because the 2015 modular force depicts deployable units in all three components of the total Army force and all three COAs work with the same total number of units. The COAs evaluated in chapter 4 only address RC units. These units all have the same ARFORGEN rotational timelines regardless of RC component (USAR or ARNG) therefore the amount and frequency of RC units available within the ARFORGEN cycle remain the same throughout all 3 COAs.
Civil Support

Civil support (CS) to the homeland is a Department of Defense (DOD), and by default an Army initiative most affected by the COAs evaluated in chapter 4. As discussed in chapter 2, the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) found a serious shortfall in DOD’s capacity to support CS emergencies such as natural disaster response. These concerns were formalized in the 2008 National Defense Act when Congress mandated that DOD become more involved in homeland security. However, the Act does not clarify the role they will play with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other federal agencies.7

One of the most controversial recommendations provided by the CNGR specifically addressed CS support. Recommendation eight of the CNGR report describes placing active duty military units under the direct control of Governors during state emergencies.8 As discussed in chapter 2, there are significant legal implications to this recommendation and the author proposes that a better way to achieve the endstate of having a larger CS force is to increase the size of the ARNG. Chapter 4 will analyze two COAs (COAs 2 and 3) that would increase CS support by providing added ARNG units.

Also discussed in chapter 2, one of the CNGR recommendations the Secretary of Defense elected not to implement was establishing the Director of the ARNG (DAG) and the Director of the Air National Guard within their respective components.9 COA 3 outlines a larger role for the National Guard Bureau as it represents full integration of the USAR into the ARNG. This integration will not be fully successful if the office of the DAG is not established, assuming the role currently held by the CAR, is not established.
This chapter provided a more comprehensive discussion about the three initiatives of modularity, ARFORGEN and CS that serve as the foundation for the author’s research. Chapter 4 provides a graphic depiction and discussion about each of the three COAs. Specifically, the author discusses how each COA is constructed using the 2015 modular force plan as the template showing how each COA impacts CS. At the conclusion of the chapter, the author provides comparative analysis of each COA based on key aspects of evaluation.


2Ibid.


5Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.

6Ted Cranford, Electronic correspondence with author, February 27, 2009.

7Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Memorandum, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves" (Washington, DC, November 24, 2008), attachment 1, pg 2.


9Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Memorandum, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves" (Washington, DC, November 24, 2008), attachment 4, pg 4.
CHAPTER 4
COURSE OF ACTION ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON

In chapter 3, the author discussed the method for evaluating the three courses of action (COAs) being compared to improve the Army reserve component (RC) structure as a whole. Also discussed in chapter 3, Army force generation (ARFORGEN) serves as a significant catalyst for this thesis but does not vary within each COA, therefore it will not serve as an evaluation criteria. Each COA is both graphically depicted and thoroughly discussed in this chapter. Analysis for each COA begins with a pie chart illustrating the distribution of United States Army Reserve (USAR) and Army National Guard (ARNG) forces within the RC then breaks them out into greater detail for each component.

The author also addresses personnel and budgetary impacts related to the COA proposals. At the conclusion of this chapter, the author provides a quantitative comparison of each of the three COAs using civil support (CS), organizational efficiency, organizational oversight, cost, and personnel as the evaluation criteria. Based on this comparison, the author recommends one of the COAs for further discussion and an implementation plan in chapter 5.

**COA 1 (Status Quo)**

COA 1 (Status Quo), as illustrated in figure 10, represents the currently approved force organizational model which is the RC portion of the 2015 modular force schematic depicted as figure 6 in chapter 3. The author will discuss modularity and civil support to the homeland as evaluation criteria for each COA.
Figure 10. COA 1 (Status Quo) RC Force

Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 2, 2009.

COA 1 (Status Quo) and Modularity

The 2015 modular force plan organizes the total Army into eleven general categories: Army Commands, Direct Reporting Units (DRUs), Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs), Theater Functional Commands (CMDs) and Centers, Corps/Division Headquarters (HQ), Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Functional Support Brigades (FSBs), Special Functional Support Brigades (SfSBs), Multi-Functional Support Brigades (MfSBs), Special Operations Forces (SOF)/Civil Affairs (CA)/Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and Generating Forces. The RC has units within all of these modular categories except for ACCs, CMDs and the Generating Force. Further refining the control group for the RC, it contains 38 types of organizations within the modular force.
Both the ARNG and USAR share 14 of the 40 types of RC organizations representing 37 percent commonality among the two components. The types of organizations shared by both the ARNG and USAR are listed in figure 11.

**COA 1 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS FOUND IN BOTH THE ARNG AND USAR (AND TOTAL)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands (16)</th>
<th>Functional Support Brigades (68)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Aviation Commands (1 in the ARNG/ 1 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Chemical Brigades (1 in the ARNG/ 1 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expeditionary Sustainment Commands (2 in the ARNG/ 8 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Engineer Brigades (7 in the ARNG/ 4 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Police Commands (1 in the ARNG/ 1 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Military Police Brigades (3 in the ARNG/ 4 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theater Sustainment Commands (1 in the ARNG/ 1 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Signal Brigades (2 in the ARNG/ 2 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional Support Groups (17 in the ARNG/ 21 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Theater Aviation Brigades (5 in the ARNG/ 1 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-functional Support Brigades (38)</td>
<td>Special Functional Support Brigades (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (16 in the ARNG/ 3 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Army Field Support Brigades (1 in the ARNG/ 3 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainment Brigades (10 in the ARNG/ 9 in the USAR)</td>
<td>• Information Operations (2 in the ARNG/ 2 in the USAR)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 11. COA 1 Modular Organizations Found in Both the ARNG and USAR


Based on this force structure, 63 percent of the RC organizations are only found in either the ARNG or the USAR and not both. In keeping with the traditional RC structure, the ARNG has most of the RC forces. The ARNG provides 28 of the 38 (74 percent) types of organizations within the RC and exclusively provides 14 of these
organizations (38 percent). The 14 types of organizations provided solely by the ARNG within the RC are listed in figure 12.

**COA 1 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS FOUND EXCLUSIVELY IN THE ARNG (AND AMOUNT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands (1)</th>
<th>Functional SPT BDEs (3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Army Air and Missile Defense Command (1)</td>
<td>• Air Defense Artillery Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Ordinance Brigade – Explosive Ordinance Disposal (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps/ Division Headquarters (8)</td>
<td>Special Functional SPT BDEs (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Division Headquarters (8)</td>
<td>• Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Brigade Operational Element (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Quartermaster Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade Combat Teams (28)</td>
<td>Special Operations/Civil Affairs /Psychological Operations Brigades and Groups (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (7)</td>
<td>• Special Forces Groups (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-functional Support Brigades (22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - E (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - H (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fires Brigade (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.  COA 1 Modular Organizations Found Exclusively in the ARNG


The only RC brigades (BDEs) that do not exist in the ARNG are the Quartermaster Brigades--Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants (POL) BDEs, Medical Brigades (MED) BDEs, CA and PSYOP BDEs. All other BDE organizations, to include the BCTs which are the centerpiece of the modular formation, exist within the ARNG.
The USAR contains 24 of the 38 types of modular organizations within the RC; 10 of which they provide exclusively. This means the USAR contains 63 percent of the types of organizations within the RC with 26 percent being exclusive to the USAR. The 10 types of organizations unique to the USAR are listed in figure 13.

### COA 1 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS FOUND EXCLUSIVELY IN THE USAR (AND AMOUNT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands (10)</th>
<th>Functional Support Brigades (13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Affairs Commands (4)</td>
<td>• Quartermaster Brigades – Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineer Commands (2)</td>
<td>• Medical Brigades (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical Deployment Support Commands (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signal Commands (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centers (6)</th>
<th>Special Operations/Civil Affairs /Psychological Operations Brigades and Groups (11)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Financial Management Centers (4)</td>
<td>• Civil Affairs Brigades (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human Resources Support Centers (2)</td>
<td>• Psychological Operations Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 13. COA 1 Modular Organizations Found Exclusively in the USAR

Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.

COA 1 (Status Quo) and Civil Support

To provide a common metric for all three COAs, CS is addressed by the numbers and types of ARNG forces found within each COA. Specifically, the comparable metric
will be BDE size ARNG forces. The ARNG force, as established previously per JP 3-28, *Civil Support*, provides localized response and is the preferred force to counter CS incidents.\(^1\) Additionally, they are not restricted by the same PCA limitations as federal forces.

Command and control is an important aspect of CS, but each COA represents the same number of divisional headquarters (8) so there is no comparative analysis at that level. Also, all three COAs portray the same number of BCTs within the ARNG (28). Using COA 1 as the baseline, the ARNG contains 122 total BDEs broken into 28 BCTs, 48 MfSBs, 38 FSBs, and 8 SfSBs.

As an interesting secondary finding, the 2015 modular force plan debunks the original organizational premise of the USAR as discussed in chapter 1. The USAR was originally designed to provide support type units to the AC, formerly referred to as combat support and combat service support units. According to the 2015 modular force design, the ARNG will have 53 of these types of organizations while the USAR will have 67. Additionally, the ARNG contains all of the support type units now found in each of 28 modular BCTs. Based on this data, one could argue the ARNG will have as many if not more support forces as the USAR.

**COA 2 (Return to Original Purpose)**

The second COA developed for comparison is one designed around returning the USAR to its original purpose. As discussed in chapter 1, the USAR formed in 1908 to provide a military medical capability that did not exist in the militia or ARNG as it is now known. With this original purpose in mind, the author finds it reasonable to portray
the USAR as it might look within its original design. Figure 14 provides a depiction of
the organizational construct for COA 2.

![Pie chart showing ARNG and USAR specific organization types]

**Figure 14.** COA 2 (Return to Original Purpose) RC Force  

**COA 2 (Return to Original Purpose) and Modularity**

COA 2 keeps both the ARNG and USAR as separate entities but provides a larger 
ARNG force to enhance CS. The author provides an organizational model for COA 2 
that returns most units to the ARNG while the USAR maintains key capabilities the 
author thinks should remain as federal entities. Of note, neither COAs 2 nor 3 contain 
duplication in capabilities as depicted in COA 1, so both COAs reflect organizations 
found only in the ARNG and USAR, respectively. The COA 2 organizational structure 
for the ARNG is depicted in figure 15.
### COA 2 Modular Organizations Found Exclusively in the ARNG (and Amount)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands/Centers (21)</th>
<th>Functional Support Brigades (76)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Army Air and Missile Defense Command (1)</td>
<td>• Air Defense Artillery Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aviation Command (2)</td>
<td>• Chemical Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineer Commands (2)</td>
<td>• Engineer Brigades (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expeditionary Sustainment Command (10)</td>
<td>• Military Police Brigades (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Police Command (2)</td>
<td>• Quartermaster Brigade – Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signal Commands (2)</td>
<td>• Signal Brigade (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theater Support Command (2)</td>
<td>• Ordinance Brigade – Explosive Ordinance Disposal (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/Division Headquarters (8)</th>
<th>Regional Support Groups (38)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Division Headquarters (8)</td>
<td>• Theater Aviation Brigade (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Brigade Combat Teams (28)</th>
<th>Special Functional Support Brigades (13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (7)</td>
<td>• Army Field Support Brigades (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20)</td>
<td>• Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Brigade Operational Element (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1)</td>
<td>• Information Operations Brigade (4)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-functional Support Brigades (60)</th>
<th>Quartermaster Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups (4)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - E (6)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - H (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fires Brigade (7)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainment Brigades (19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 15. COA 2 Modular Organizations Found Exclusively in the ARNG


The COA 2 organizational structure for the ARNG contains all units currently residing in the ARNG adding two types of Commands (four total units) and one type of FSB (three total units). It also represents all of the types of units previously shared by both the USAR and ARNG. In summary, COA 2 depicts the ARNG with 30 of the 38 types of organizations (79 percent) within the RC with the USAR maintaining eight types of specialty units (21 percent).
The next figure for COA 2 depicts the organizational structure for the USAR. The author thinks these units would not be constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) in a CS role since they doctrinally would not serve in a direct civil law enforcement capacity. These types of units are also highly specialized and benefit from centralized, federal control for personnel, funding and equipment management. The COA 2 organizational structure for the USAR is depicted below in figure 16.

### COA 2 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS FOUND IN THE USAR (AND AMOUNT)

**Commands/ Centers (12)**
- Civil Affairs Commands (4)
- Medical Deployment Support Commands (2)
- Financial Management Centers (4)
- Human Resources Support Centers (2)

**Functional Support Brigades (10)**
- Medical Brigades (10)

**Special Operations/Civil Affairs /Psychological Operations Brigades and Groups (13)**
- Civil Affairs Brigades (9)
- Psychological Operations Brigades (2)
- Special Forces Groups (2)

*Figure 16. COA 2 Modular Organizations Found Exclusively in the USAR*

Figure 16 depicts how the USAR might look if it returned to its original purpose. This means it would provide RC units specifically required by the AC but not found in the ARNG. Also, under this COA, the author chose to move the two Special Forces Groups from the ARNG to the USAR to provide a more efficient command and control structure for the “SOF/CA/PSYOP BDEs and groups” category of units.

COA 2 (Return to Original Purpose) and Civil Support

Both COAs 2 and 3 provide a significant increase to the ARNG force structure thereby improving CS capabilities as explained by the author. Serving as the currently approved modular force structure and baseline for comparison, COA 2 started with 122 BDEs in the ARNG reflected in COA 1 and transfers another 12 MfSBs, 36 FSBs, and 5 SfSBs from the USAR to the ARNG. This increases the Title 32 ARNG force by 53 to a total of 175 BDEs representing a 30 percent increase in CS capabilities.

COA 3 (Full Integration)

COA 3 represents the most radical departure from COA 1 or the “status quo.” There is little difference between COAs 2 and 3 from a capabilities standpoint, but COA 3 takes the RC restructuring concept one step further by fully integrating the USAR into the ARNG. Figure 17 depicts the organization construct for COA 3.
Figure 17. COA 3 (Full Integration) RC Force Structure

Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.

COA3 (Full Integration) and Modularity

This COA expands the Title 10 structure of the National Guard Bureau to assume specialty unit command and control provided by the USAR in COA 2. The COA 2 organizational structure for ARNG units serving in a federal capacity is depicted in figure 18.
## COA 3 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN THE FEDERAL ARNG (AND AMOUNT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commands (22)</th>
<th>Functional Support Brigades (10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Army Air and Missile Defense Command (1)</td>
<td>• Medical Brigades (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aviation Command (1)</td>
<td>Special Operations/Civil Affairs/Psychological</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Civil Affairs Commands (4)</td>
<td>Operations Brigades and Groups (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineer Commands (2)</td>
<td>• Civil Affairs Brigades (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Expeditionary Support Commands (10)</td>
<td>• Psychological Operations Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Medical Deployment Support Command (2)</td>
<td>• Special Forces Groups (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Police Command (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signal Commands (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theater Support Commands (2)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centers (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Financial Management Centers (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Human Resources Support Center (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 18.   COA 3 Modular Organizations Serving in the Federal ARNG  

The major difference between COAs 3 and 2 is the number of commands (CMDs) and centers serving in a federal capacity as opposed to the SDCs. For COA 2, the author chose to place all the CMDs and centers, except for the specialty ones, in the ARNG. This was done to maintain continuity as all their subordinated FSBs, MfSBs and specialty BDEs exist in the ARNG; therefore, the author thinks the CMDs should exist there as well.

For COA 3 there is only one overall RC organization as the USAR fully integrates into the ARNG. With this COA, the author chose to place all CMDs and centers in the
Title 10 portion of the ARNG under the National Guard Bureau or, specifically, the Director of the Army National Guard (DAG) as recommended by the CNGR. This provides the same amount of federal oversight and standardization as COAs 1 and 2 with improved linkage to the remaining ARNG forces.

As discussed in COA 2, the BDE level ARNG force structure for both COAs 2 and 3 are the same. The COA 3 ARNG force structure is illustrated in figure 19.

**COA 3 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN THE SDC ARNG (AND AMOUNT)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Corps/ Division Headquarters (8)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Division Headquarters (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Brigade Combat Teams (28)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multi-functional Support Brigades (56)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - E (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Combat Aviation Brigade - H (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fires Brigade (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sustainment Brigades (19)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional Support Brigades (74)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Air Defense Artillery Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Chemical Brigades (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineer Brigades (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Military Police Brigades (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quartermaster Brigade – Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Signal Brigade (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ordinance Brigade – Explosive Ordinance Disposal (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Regional Support Groups (38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Theater Aviation Brigade (6)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Functional Support Brigades (13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Army Field Support Brigades (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Brigade Operational Element (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Information Operations Brigade (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Quartermaster Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups (4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 19. COA 3 Title 32 Modular Organizations Serving in the SDC ARNG

COA3 (Full Integration) and Civil Support

COA 3 provides the same BDE level ARNG force allocation as COA 2. As shown above, the SDC force within the ARNG would consist of 175 BDE size units representing the same 30 percent increase from COA 1 in CS. This COA does not address any RC forces stationed outside the SDCs, which would fall under the federal command and control of the DAG.

Personnel and Monetary Considerations

The author used the same number of modular units in all three COAs to provide the same control group and mirror the approved 2015 modular force design. However, full integration should provide added manning efficiencies as well as the aforementioned capability improvements. For example, the USAR is reorganizing its regional headquarters to consist of four Regional Support Commands (RSC’s) to manage USAR units. These headquarters would no longer be necessary as the SDC ARNG forces are administratively managed by the respective SDC command structure. The remaining federal forces would be managed directly by the respective specialty commands and the DAG just as the CAR manages them now.

Also, there would most likely be a reduced need for Regional Support Groups (RSGs) currently projected in the 2015 modular force at 38 consisting of 84 Soldiers each². Additionally, full integration would prompt a relook at the four financial management centers (FMCs) consisting of 36 Soldiers each.³ Recruiting support demands should also decline as the RC would no longer have to sell a separate brand (USAR) and market it against the other component of the RC (ARNG). Currently, there
are 2170 Soldiers serving in United States Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) specifically for USAR recruiting with a budget of more than $26.5 million.

From another standpoint, the 2009 USAR Posture Statement shows the USAR budget for FY 2008 was $6.9 billion. As mentioned in chapter 2, 94 percent of the budget for ARNG forces comes from the federal budget with six percent provided by the respective SDC in which they reside. This means that full integration as outlined in COA 3 would provide SDC leaders with a 30 percent larger force at an increased cost of only 6 percent. This would save the federal government $414 million while spreading the expense proportionally across the 54 gaining SDCs. The author realizes full integration would not completely erase all redundancy costs, but even a reduction of 80 percent could save the Army $352 million. More importantly, it could save 3,354 uniformed Soldier positions representing the approximate number found in a modular BDE. These positions may be transferred to meet other requirements or removed entirely providing added cost savings for Army.

**COA Comparison**

So far each of the COAs has been discussed separately under the headings of modularity and CS, and the author has provided additional insights about personnel and monetary considerations. Now, the author provides a quantitative format to compare each of them to one another. The evaluation criteria used for the analysis are CS, organizational efficiency, organizational oversight, cost and personnel. Arguments could be made that some of the evaluation criteria are more important than others but, for the sake of comparative simplicity, each of the evaluation criteria is evenly weighted.
CS is the aspect most significantly impacted by the author’s research. For figure 20, CS is defined as the number of RC BDE’s found in the ARNG. More ARNG BDEs are better since they can be employed without PCA restrictions and, more importantly, they are controlled locally when serving as an SDC force which is the ideal condition for CS. As determined previously in this chapter, COA 1 contains 122 ARNG BDEs while COAs 2 and 3 contain 175 ARNG BDEs.

Organizational efficiency analyzes the SDC and federal capability redundancies found in the RC. As the example provided in chapter 1 illustrates, it seems inefficient to have the same type of unit (in the author’s example it is a military police company) in two separate RC components. This may have been desirable in the pre 9/11 strategic reserve, but does not make sense to the author in the post 9/11 operational reserve organized as modular units. For figure 20, organizational efficiency is defined as the percentage of capabilities found in both the ARNG and the USAR. The lower the percentage the better as it reduces RC inefficiencies and streamlines the command and control structure as it pertains to CS employment. Per figure 10 at the beginning of this chapter, COA 1 contains 37 percent capability redundancy while COAs 2 and 3 contain none.

Organizational oversight evaluates the number of subordinate Army commands in the RC. As discussed in chapter 1, the ARNG began as independent militias for each state in 1636 while the USAR was established as a federal reserve in 1908. COA 2 provides the author’s interpretation of how the USAR would look if it returned to its original purpose of providing specialty unit augmentation to the AC. COA 3 builds on a recommendation made by the CNGR to establish the position of the Director of the
The Secretary of Defense elected not to establish this position because the DAG would have no real authority since the ARNG, as it currently exists, falls under the purview of each SDC leader. For figure 20, organizational oversight is defined as the number of oversight organizations found in the RC. COAs 1 and 2 contain two (ARNG and USAR) while COA 3 contains only the ARNG, whether at the SDC or federal level. COA 3 requires the establishment of the position of the DAG to fully deactivate the USAR as a separate RC organization. The author thinks less organizational oversight is better as it streamlines guidance for the RC as a whole and reduces the RC “brand” marketed by the Army to only the ARNG.

The previously discussed personnel and monetary considerations subheading outlines some additional savings to be derived from RC restructuring. It is difficult to accurately depict the impact restructuring might have on the RC, but the author uses some broad considerations to provide some insight. The analysis specifically targets COA 3 but there would most assuredly be some savings, although not as significant, for COA2. For figure 20, cost is defined as the amount of money saved while personnel is defined as the number of uniformed Soldier billets saved. In both cases, more is better. For COA 3, the author forecasts a $352 million savings and another 3,354 personnel savings. Despite the fact that personnel and monetary savings for COA 2 cannot be quantified, the author uses <$352 million and <3,354 to account for the fact that the savings will be more than COA 1 but less than COA 3. Figure 20 provides the quantitative analysis using each of the evaluation criteria discussed previously.
Based on the comparative analysis provided in figure 20, COA 3 (full integration) provides the greatest organizational benefit for the RC with COA 2 serving as a close second. COA 2 provides all of the benefits of CS but, once all the BDEs are transferred to the ARNG, it begs the question as to whether or not the RC still needs two distinctly separate organizational components. COA 3 builds on one of the recommendations made by the CNGR to establish the DAG which the author thinks has validity under this structural model. Either way, it seems both COAs 2 and 3 accurately capitalizes on the post 9/11 initiatives with COA 3 providing the greatest benefit.

This chapter provided detailed analysis of each of the three COAs as well as personnel and monetary considerations. It concluded with a quantitative comparison of
each of the COAs resulting in the recommendation for COA 3 implementation. The next and final chapter, chapter 5, provides added discussion about COA 3; specifically how the author recommends it be implemented, as well as additional insights and concluding thoughts.


2Robert Jardon, Electronic Correspondence with author, March 26, 2009.

3Ted Cranford, Electronic correspondence with author, March 26, 2009.

4Rodney Berry, Electronic correspondence with author, February 24, 2009.

5Frederick Eaton, Electronic correspondence with author, March 24, 2009.


7William Waff, Interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, November 17, 2008.


10Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Memorandum, "Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (Washington, DC, November 24, 2008), attachment 4, pg 4.
It is not clear that the nation’s military capabilities are arrayed appropriately to meet the threats facing the country. The Army Reserve contains primarily combat support and combat service support capabilities that are useful in responding to domestic crises. The Army National Guard is structured to provide large formation combat arms capabilities for overseas missions, as well as combat support and combat service support capabilities useful at home. Although specific requirements for the homeland must be developed before informed decisions can be made, it is likely that some rebalancing of forces will be necessary for DOD to meet its homeland responsibilities.

— Arnold Punaro,
Final Report of Commission on the National Guard and Reserves

Since 9/11, the Army reserve component (RC) has transformed alongside the active component (AC) in a manner never before seen. Gone are the days of a strategic reserve postured for a conventional fight after executing an extended deployment. The initiatives of Army force generation (ARFORGEN), modularity, and civil support (CS) to homeland may have been born out of necessity but have evolved into a viable force design for the foreseeable future. The author is not naïve to the fact that politics play a significant role in the organizational structure of the RC but this thesis provides quantitative data to extend RC restructuring discussions beyond mere political obstacles. Hopefully it provides a foundation of facts and professional opinions to support informed discussions about the future of the RC.

Based on the author’s research it appears course of action (COA) 3 (Full Integration of the USAR into the ARNG) is the best choice to capitalize on the three initiatives of ARFORGEN, modularity and CS. COA 2 provides the same CS improvements as COA 3, but COA 2 maintains the USAR as a separate organization.
The author thinks establishing the position of Director of the ARNG (DAG) and dissolving the USAR as a separate organization helps streamline command, control and advisory efforts within the RC and alleviates marketing the USAR and ARNG separately within the RC. To recap, the COA 3 organization structure analyzed in chapter 3 is provided in figures 21-24.

![Figure 21. COA 3 (Full Integration) RC Force Structure Types of Units](source)

*Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.*

![Figure 22. COA 3 (Full Integration) RC Force Structure Amount of Units](source)

*Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.*
COA 3 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN THE FEDERAL ARNG (AND AMOUNT)

Commands (22)
- Army Air and Missile Defense Command (1)
- Aviation Command (1)
- Civil Affairs Commands (4)
- Engineer Commands (2)
- Expeditionary Support Commands (10)
- Medical Deployment Support Command (2)
- Military Police Command (2)
- Signal Commands (2)
- Theater Support Commands (2)

Functional Support Brigades (10)
- Medical Brigades (10)

Special Operations/Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations Brigades and Groups (13)
- Civil Affairs Brigades (9)
- Psychological Operations Brigades (2)
- Special Forces Groups (2)

Centers (6)
- Financial Management Centers (4)
- Human Resources Support Center (2)

Figure 23. COA 3 Modular Organizations Serving in the Federal ARNG

Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.
COA 3 MODULAR ORGANIZATIONS SERVING IN THE SDC ARNG (AND AMOUNT)

Corps/Division Headquarters (8)
- Division Headquarters (8)
  - Brigade Combat Teams (28)
  - Heavy Brigade Combat Teams (7)
  - Infantry Brigade Combat Teams (20)
  - Stryker Brigade Combat Team (1)

Multi-functional Support Brigades (56)
- Battlefield Surveillance Brigade (7)
- Combat Aviation Brigade - E (6)
- Combat Aviation Brigade - H (2)
- Fires Brigade (7)
- Maneuver Enhancement Brigades (19)
- Sustainment Brigades (19)

Functional Support Brigades (74)
- Air Defense Artillery Brigades (2)
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- Theater Aviation Brigade (6)

Special Functional Support Brigades (13)
- Army Field Support Brigades (4)
- Ground-Based Mid-Course Missile Defense Brigade Operational Element (1)
- Information Operations Brigade (4)
- Quartermaster Theater Aviation Sustainment Maintenance Groups (4)

Figure 24. COA 3 Modular Organizations Serving in the SDC ARNG

Source: Kerry Schindler, Electronic correspondence with author, April 23, 2009.

COA 3 provides the greatest deviation from the status quo but would serve to streamline numerous capabilities within the RC. The analysis provided in chapter 4 only evaluated the types and numbers of BDEs. The author’s capability analysis for modular units, specifically BDEs, does not result in a specific troop count as each BDE is tailored to suit each mission. One could deviate from the COA’s state, District and commonwealth (SDC) versus federal force allocation but the conclusion to create a larger SDC ARNG force remains valid. A 30 percent increase in the SDC ARNG based on the modular design as portrayed in COA 3 represents a significant increase in CS
capabilities. This increase comes at no expense to the modular force conversion or ARFORGEN initiatives, as neither distinguishes between USAR and ARNG RC units required for federal service. The author proposes a three phased concept for integrating the USAR into the ARNG as outlined in COA 3.

Phased Integration

Phase 1 (Concept Approval)

This phase begins with COA 3 (Full integration of the RC) approval and ends with the deactivation of the USAR. The first key task associated with this COA is to establish the Office of the Director of the Army National Guard (ODAG) per CNGR recommendation. Once the ODAG is established, all functions and responsibilities of the Office of the Chief of the Army Reserve (OCAR) would transfer to the ODAG while maintaining the subordinate USAR force structure in place as it currently exists under the command and control of the ODAG. This phase concludes with the closing of the OCAR and deactivation of the USAR. At the conclusion of this phase there would be no change to the distribution of SDC and federal RC forces, but the federal RC forces would be commanded by a different authority (the DAG vice the CAR).

Phase 2 (Set Conditions)

This phase begins upon full integration of the USAR into the ARNG and ends when conditions are set to transfer identified federal RC units to the SDC ARNG force structure. During this phase, the DAG works with the respective SDC’s to revamp the personnel management system enhancing transferability from SDC to SDC and SDC to federal forces. Additionally, the DAG would analyze the federal units slated for transfer...
to the SDCs to ensure proper force allocation and geographical dispersion. The personnel management and force allocation analysis would require extensive effort, but once the analysis is complete, the DAG would transfer units from the federal RC force to the respective SDC ARNG as determined.

In order to more effectively align federal, state and local efforts, the author recommends aligning the eight divisional headquarters in the ARNG with the ten regional command centers belonging to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as depicted in figure 25. This arrangement may prove problematic if one or more of the divisions were to deploy, but a plan could be created to augment the deployed division(s) with adjutant general staff support from the states throughout the region.

![Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Organization Chart](http://www.fema.gov/about/regions/index.shtm)

**Figure 25.** Federal Emergency Management Agency Regional Organization Chart

The DHS and DOD would be able to more effectively manage homeland security efforts with the regional FEMA headquarters providing federal assistance linked to the SDC ARNG forces managed by the respective divisional headquarters. The divisional headquarters would synchronize SDC support with the respective TAGs in the affected states as witnessed during Hurricane Katrina. As mentioned previously, full integration of the USAR into the ARNG would provide a 30 percent larger SDC ARNG force. This should help mitigate federal versus SDC command and control issues and ideally reduce CS requirements for the AC all together.

Phase 3 (Complete the Transfer)

This phase begins when conditions are set to transfer slated units from the federal ARNG to the SDC ARNG and ends when the transfer is complete. Under this concept of integration, the single point of contact for all federal RC employment is the DAG who also provides advisory guidance to the SDCs about their organic ARNG forces. As one might imagine with this magnitude of organizational change, there are some significant areas of restructuring requiring additional research.

Recommendations for Future Research

With any form a change, there are always consequences--some good, some bad. Fully integrating the USAR into the ARNG would require a complete overhaul of the current ARNG personnel management systems as identified in phase 2 of the RC integration. This requirement is not entirely a bad one and could spark significant improvements. For example, each SDC currently manages its personnel assignments and promotions separately. To alleviate this problem there needs to be a more streamlined
system to transfer from SDC to SDC, or in and out of federal units as required. This is not a newly created issue as some Soldiers currently transfer somewhat routinely. However, integration will aggravate current and newly created personnel management issues related to integration therefore it warrants further research.

One immediate benefit of full integration from a personnel management standpoint is that Soldiers will now have easier access to a 30 percent larger selection of units and the former USAR Soldiers will see a 37 percent increase the types of units currently found exclusively in the ARNG. This should provide a significant benefit as Soldiers would have greater unit options within their desired geographically area. They would also no longer need to process an RC component transfer request to move from an ARNG unit to an assignment at the former USAR unit across town.

There is also room to improve the RC promotional system giving RC Soldiers the option to forego a promotion if remaining in their geographical area is more important that career advancement. For example, promotion to more senior ranks such as sergeant first class (SFC) and major (MAJ) could be regionalized and a promotion order of merit list (OML) created. If a person chose to take a promotion to SFC or MAJ (and further up in rank) in a billet 200 miles away then he could accept the promotion under the authority of the Governor of the state where the unit is located. If he chooses not to accept the assignment because it is too far away, then he could stay where he is at in his current rank until a promotion billet closer to home becomes available.

Since a lot of Reservists and Guardsmen consider geographical considerations first and foremost, they would not be penalized under the "up or out" promotion system we currently have. This system of promotion or separation, as it currently exists, is
heavily criticized in the CNGR report that was discussed in chapter 2. The author also recommends changing all active personnel, now called active Guard and Reservists (AGRs)s, in the ARNG to Title 10 positions. This would provide nationwide assignment to enhance cross-fertilization within units.

ARFORGEN is another area that requires further research based on the author’s proposal for restructuring. As the operational environment continues to change, the AC depends on a tailored RC force and ARFORGEN can be used to provide such a force. United States Forces Command (FORSCOM), in conjunction with the Army G3, could develop an RC force requirement and task the SDC ARNG forces to serve in that capacity as they enter the Train-Ready Force Pool of the ARFORGEN cycle.

To further the discussion, the RC force could consist of a division headquarters comprised of five brigade combat teams, four functional support brigades and two multi-functional support brigades with an added federal ARNG medical brigade and one special operations forces group. Once this tailored force enters the available pool of the ARFORGEN cycle they would deploy for a year in support of Title 10 requirements or remain in Title 32 status on standby for use. As the next tailored ARNG force enters the available pool, they would assume the federal requirement and the former units would regenerate into the reset pool. All other ARNG forces would remain available, as they are now, to support an accelerated ARFORGEN rotation timeline but would continue to serve in an SDC capacity until needed for federal service. Full integration of the USAR into the ARNG, as outlined in COA 3 of chapter 4, will support this type of force generation for federal missions while preserving a larger and more capable force for SDC employment.
The final aspect of restructuring the RC that merits further research is enhancing interagency cooperation between DOD and the other local, state and federal agencies. For example, as mentioned in the Phase 2 integration discussion within this chapter, the ARNG should enhance CS response capabilities by realigning the divisional headquarters with the regional FEMA offices. Some might conclude that ARNG divisional headquarters serving in this type of direct CS role detracts from its warfighting capability. The author disagrees. CS may not directly improve an ARNG division’s capability to provide conventional offense and defense command and control, but as seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq, stability operations can be as complicated as conventional offense and defense operations. The most recent edition of the FM 3-0, *Operations*, was updated to reflect this and stability operations are now equally as important as offensive and defensive operations. The author thinks that further enhancing the homeland CS role provides a practical venue for SDC ARNG units, especially the SDC ARNG divisional headquarters, to prepare for overseas stability operations.

In conclusion, the areas of personnel management, ARFORGEN and interagency coordination warrant further research. This is especially true if the course of action recommended by the author were to become reality. The author provides the aforementioned insights about these issues, but they are not based on substantive data.

**Concluding Thoughts**

Arguably, the post 9/11 RC is the best reserve that has ever existed in our history. The author does not propose RC integration and deactivation of the USAR as a reflection of any lack in capability by the USAR. To the contrary, the author finds that the USAR filled the void between the “militia” and the AC since its origination 101 years ago.
Former Secretary of War Elihu Root would be proud of how the once loosely organized militia he once knew has evolved into a formidable SDC ARNG fully capable of serving as a federal reserve. The USAR he helped create has continually led the charge for more fully integrating the RC and AC components to the point where the author thinks the ARNG, through the establishment of the DAG, could assume the Title 10 oversight role currently filled by the CAR.

The initiatives of ARFORGEN and modularity eliminated the disparities between the ARNG and USAR as a federal reserve but the ARNG’s unique ability to provide CS to the homeland clearly separates it from the USAR. The RC will most assuredly undergo organizational changes in the near future to adapt to the post 9/11 security environment and increased budget constraints. It is up to senior Army and political leaders to decide if they will be superficial, only addressing peripheral impacts of RC inefficiencies or comprehensive, improving the root organizational structure.

GLOSSARY

Civil support. Department of Defense warfighting capabilities that could be applied to foreign and/or domestic assistance or law enforcement support missions.

Homeland defense. The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President.

Homeland security. A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, major disasters, and other emergencies; and minimize the damage and recover from attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies that occur.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. A Congressional act designed to provide a means by which the federal government may supplement state and local resources in major disasters or emergencies where those state and local resources have been or will be overwhelmed. The Act provides separate but similar mechanisms for declaration of a major disaster and for declaration of an emergency. Except to the extent that an emergency involves primarily federal interests, both declarations of major disaster and declarations of emergency must be triggered by a request to the President from the Governor of the affected state.
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Center for Army Tactics
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Dr. Alexander M. Bielakowski
Department of Military History
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

Lieutenant Colonel Luis O. Rodriguez
Staff Judge Advocate
USACGSC
100 Stimson Ave.
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301